Squandering Our Inheritance: Re-Forming the Canadian Welfare State in the 1990s by Ellsworth, Randall
Journal of Law and Social Policy
Volume 12 Article 10
1997
Squandering Our Inheritance: Re-Forming the
Canadian Welfare State in the 1990s
Randall Ellsworth
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/jlsp
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Osgoode Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of
Law and Social Policy by an authorized editor of Osgoode Digital Commons.
Citation Information
Ellsworth, Randall. "Squandering Our Inheritance: Re-Forming the Canadian Welfare State in the 1990s." Journal of Law and Social
Policy 12. (1997): 259-290.
https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/jlsp/vol12/iss1/10
SQUANDERING OUR INHERITANCE:




Cet article 6tudie l'6volution des processus distincts de r~formes dans les
domaines de l'assurance-ch6mage, du R6gime de pensions du Canada, des
prestations aux personnes ag6es de la s6curitd de la vieillesse, des indemnitds
aux travailleurs accidentds et de l'aide social. I1 6tudie 6galement les
changements au syst~me de paiements de transfert entre les gouvernements
f~ddral et provincial de mfime que les gouvernements provincial et municipaux.
Apr~s avoir examind la situation actuelle des programmes sociaux et des
ententes fiscales, l'article traite des th~mes communs qui ont ressorti des
processus de r6forme et de leurs rdpercussions sur l'ttat providence canadien.
"Some are lucky, some are unlucky. That's life, I think you have to keep
trying."l
Jean Chretien
"... it's winners and losers and don't get caught on the wrong side of that
line."2
Bruce Springsteen
Copyright 1997, Randall Ellsworth. Randall Ellsworth is a research lawyer with the
Clinic Resource Office of the Ontario Legal Aid Plan (CRO). The CRO provides legal
research and resource and training materials to practitioners in Ontario community
legal clinics. Any opinions expressed herein are those of the author and not necessar-
ily those of the Ontario Legal Aid Plan.
1. E. Greenspon, "PM challenged on jobs, Quebec" The Globe and Mail (11 December,
1996) Al at A4. The Prime Minister was responding to a question from a member of
the audience in CBC's Electronic Town Hall. The questioner, who had been unable to
find full time employment, had asked when the federal government was going to create
enough jobs. The Prime Minister suggested that, if the questioner could not find work
where she lived, then she should think about moving.
2. From the song "Atlantic City" on the album Nebraska (1982).
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A. INTRODUCTION
Without a doubt, these have been "interesting" times for those engaged in the
social policy field. The social safety net in this country has been and is being
re-examined strand by strand. Strangely, there appears to be little recognition
that it is the strands together which form the net. Each strand is allegedly being
made more efficient, more affordable and more cost-effective, with little con-
sideration to the final net which the strands will form when they are finally
rewoven.
Over the last three years, in Ontario alone, the following programs and legisla-
tion have been subject to review and reform: unemployment insurance, the
Canada Pension Plan, old age security payments to seniors, workers' compen-
sation and social assistance. Further, the system of transfer payments between
the federal government and the provincial government and between the provin-
cial government and its municipalities for the purpose of funding social services
and social assistance has been greatly altered. It is difficult to imagine any
portion of the "welfare state" which has not been touched by some aspect of
these reforms.
Fortunately (or unfortunately, depending upon your outlook), the process is
not over. For various reasons, and from various perspectives, it may be useful
and necessary to review these different programs, which have evolved over
several decades in an independent, haphazard way. What seems to make little
sense is that they are being reviewed independently and that the probable
result will continue to be independent programs. There needs to be greater
recognition of the fact that these programs are financially and administra-
tively interdependent and are meant to protect against or ameliorate certain
conditions which are shared by many of the people who rely upon the
individual programs.
The purpose of this paper is to briefly examine the evolution of these separate
reform processes, to summarize the present state of these processes and, most
importantly, to analyse the similarities in the issues which are dealt with in these
processes and their implications for the welfare state in Canada.
B. OVERVIEW OF THE RE-FORMING
This overview is presented in a chronological manner rather than on a program
by program basis. It is not an attempt at any comprehensive overview or critique
of any of the reviews of the particular programs, but rather it is an attempt to
convey the sheer magnitude and diversity of the reviews as they unfolded.
The starting date for this chronology is October of 1994. It is then that the federal
government finally introduced its long awaited (and long delayed) discussion
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paper Agenda: Jobs and Growth - Improving Social Security in Canada,3 which
set out options for restructuring federal social security programs and spending.
While this date might appear to be arbitrary, it is arguable that the prelude to
and release of the Green Paper placed social policy issues squarely in the
forefront of public consciousness.
This is not to suggest that events in the field of social policy prior to October
1994 were of little import. In fact some events prior to this date must be flagged
in order to place future developments in context. In 1990 the Progressive
Conservative federal government decided, unilaterally, to "cap" payments under
the Canada Assistance Plan4 to Ontario, British Columbia and Alberta, which
placed increasing burdens on the budgets of the affected provinces, due to the
rise in social assistance costs. 5 A significant federal/provincial initiative was the
"social and economic union" clause in the Charlottetown Accord. 6 The "cap on
CAP" and the demise of the Charlottetown Accord probably marked the begin-
ning of the end of the era of cooperative federalism in the area of social policy.
Prior changes of significance in the area of unemployment insurance included
the federal government's withdrawal as a contributor to the UI fund, increases
in the entrance requirements for UI eligibility, a reduction in the number of
weeks for which benefits were payable, reductions in the benefit rate payable
and an "enhanced" rate of benefits for claimants with low earnings.
7
3. (Human Resources Development Canada) (Supply and Services Canada) October, 1994
[hereinafter the Green Paper]. There were also a series of nine supplementary papers
released which provided more detailed information about the current system and the
options outlined in the discussion paper.
4. R.S.C. 1985, c. C-1 [Hereinafter CAP]. CAP provided for 50-50 cost sharing of social
assistance costs between the provinces and the federal government. The "cap" on the
transfers to these provinces was 5% per year.
5. For a discussion of these implications, see R. Ellsworth & I. Morrison, "Poverty Law in
Ontario: The Year in Review" (1991), 7.J.L. & Social Pol'y 1 at 13-17 [hereinafter
Review 1991].
6. The text of the Accord provided, in part:
The policy objectives set out in the provision on social union should include but not be
limited to:
providing adequate social services and benefits to ensure that all individuals
resident in Canada have reasonable access to housing, food and other basic
necessities...
This text is taken from the August 28 revised draft of the Charlottetown agreement, as
reproduced in the Globe and Mail (1 September, 1992), Al, A8.
7. For a discussion of the implications of these changes see Review 1991 at 37, R. Ells-
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In the area of workers' compensation in Ontario, the changes were no less wide
ranging. The beginning of the decade brought some of the most significant
changes to the "historic compromise" 8 which was at the heart of the workers'
compensation system. Bill 1629 eliminated the "pension for life" for workers
who suffered injuries in the workplace and replaced it with a dual award, wage
loss system, in which injured workers received a lump sum award as compen-
sation for the injury and were eligible for further benefits if they suffered a wage
loss as a result of the injury. In May of 1994 the NDP provincial government
introduced Bill 165.10 Bill 165 introduced a "purpose" clause into the Workers'
Compensation Actl 1 which required the Workers' Compensation Board to act in
a "financially responsible and accountable manner". Further, Bill 165 removed
the automatic, full inflation protection for injured workers' benefits under the
Act and replaced it with a partial indexation formula. The bill also made
provision for a special supplement to be paid to the poorest of the permanently
disabled workers. 12
It would be tedious and overwhelming to discuss the numerous legislative
changes to the social assistance system in Ontario since the start of the decade.
Much of the eligibility and entitlement criteria are contained in the regulations
made under the two governing pieces of legislation. There have been 35 major
or minor changes to the regulations under the Family Benefits Act13 and 40 such
changes to the regulations under the General Welfare Assistance Act.14 During
worth, I. Morrison, J. Keene & P. Rapsey, "Poverty Law in Ontario: The Year in
Review" (1993), 9 J. L. & Social Pol'y 1 at 31 [hereinafter Review 1993] and, R. Ells-
worth, I. Morrison, J. Keene, P. Rapsey & G. Pearce, "Poverty Law in Ontario: The
Year in Review" (1994), 10 J. L. & Social Pol'y 1 at 35-36 [hereinafter Review 1994].
8. The principle underlying workers' compensation legislation was that workers' gave up
their right to sue their employers with respect to workplace accidents in return for a no-
fault compensation system.
9. Workers' Compensation Amendment Act, 1989, S.O. 1989, c. 47.
10. An Act to amend the Workers' Compensation Act and the Occupational Health and
Safety Act, S.O. 1994 c. 24. Bill 165 was proclaimed in force in January, 1995.
11. R.S.O. 1990, c. W-11, as amended.
12. Supra, note 10. This is contained in section 147(14) of the present Act. The supplement
was aimed at workers who had suffered a permanent disablement prior to 1990 but had
only received a small pension as compensation for that injury. Many of the recipients of
this supplement were also in receipt of social assistance.
13. R.S.O. 1990, c. F-2,as amended [hereinafter the FBA] and Regulation 336, R.R.O.
1990, as amended.
14. R.S.O. 1990, c. G-6 [hereinafter the GWA] and Regulation 537, R.R.O. 1990, as
amended.
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the same time period there have also been several law reform proposals for the
social assistance system, including Back on Track and Time for Action 15 as well
as Turning Point, the NDP provincial government's white paper on welfare
reform.'
6
Finally, the beginning of the decade saw the federal government change the way
in which OldAge Security Act 17 benefits were paid. The technique used for this
was the "clawback": high income seniors continued to receive the "universal"
OAS payment, but were required to pay some (or all) of that amount back at
income tax time, if their income from all sources exceeded a certain ceiling. 18
All of which brings us back to October of 1994. The Green Paper contained
detailed options for reform of the Unemployment Insurance system and for
CAP.19 In November of 1994, the Ontario government announced a Royal
Commission into the workers' compensation system, with a mandate to make
recommendations on reforming the system. 20 In February of 1995 Finance
Minister Paul Martin delivered the federal budget which outlined a pending
reform of the OAS/GIS regime, announced a forthcoming review of the CPP
and proposed the Canada Social Transfer, a new arrangement between the
provinces and the federal government for sharing the cost of social programs.2 1
15. Ontario, Back on Track: First Report of the Advisory Group on New Social Assistance
Legislation (Toronto: Queen's Printer, 1991)(Chair: A. Moscovitch) and Ontario, Time
for Action: Final Report of the Advisory Group on New Social Assistance Legislation
(Toronto: Queen's Printer, 1992)(Chair: A. Moscovitch). These proposals followed the
rather exhaustive study contained in Ontario, Report of the Social Assistance Review
Committee: Transitions (Toronto: Queen's Printer, 1988)(Chair: G. Thomson). For
commentary and critiques of Back on Track and Time for Action see Review 1991 at 16-
18, and R. Ellsworth & I. Morrison "Poverty Law in Ontario: The Year in Review"
(1992), 8 J. L. & Social Pol'y 1 [hereinafter Review 1992] at 9-11.
16. Ontario, Turning Point. New Support Programs for People with Low Incomes (July,
1993). For commentary and critique of Turning Point see Review 1993 at 18-21 and
Review 1994 at 7-8.
17. R.S.C. 1985, c. 0-9, as amended [hereinafter OAS].
18. See National Council of Welfare, A Pension Primer, (Minister of Supply and Services;
Summer 1996) at 4. High income seniors were required to pay back 15 cents of every
dollar of net income above this ceiling. In 1995 that ceiling was $53,215.
19. Supra., note 3 at 42-52 (for UI) and at 72-79 (for CAP).
20. "Labour Minister Launches Royal Commission on Workers' Compensation", Ministry
of Labour News Release (November, 1994). The Royal Commission was charged with
examining the financial viability of the system, benefit and entitlement issues, the scope
of coverage and the relationship between workers' compensation and other income
replacement schemes and to explore other compensation models for workplace injuries.
21. The Honourable Paul Martin, Budget Speech, (February 27, 1995). The Canada Social
Transfer is discussed at 17-19. The review of the CPP and changes to the CASIGIS
(1997) 12 Journal of Law and Social Policy
By June of 1995, the legislative provisions establishing the Canada Health and
Social Transfer (CHST) had received Royal Assent.
22
Also in June of 1995, a new Conservative government came to power in Ontario,
with a decidedly different philosophy on social policy than its NDP predecessor.
In July of 1995, this new provincial government cancelled the Royal Commis-
sion on workers' compensation and announced its own review of the system, to
be conducted by a minister of the provincial cabinet.
23
In August of 1995 the provinces established the Ministerial Council on Social
Policy Reform and Renewal, which was created to present a united front on the
part of the provinces for dealing with Ottawa on social policy issues. 24 In its
September Throne speech, the Ontario government outlined its plans for "work-
fare". 25 In October, provincial regulations reducing the level of welfare assis-
tance in Ontario by 22% came into effect and there were indications that the
province was intending to follow through on its campaign pledge to create a
separate income support program for the disabled and the elderly.
26
In November of 1995 the B.C. government announced that it would impose a
three-month residency requirement for the purposes of welfare eligibility in the
province, in contravention of the terms of CAP.27 In December of 1995 the
Ministerial Council on Social Policy Reform and Renewal released its prelim-
inary report to the provincial premiers (although not to the public), which
regime were discussed at 20-21. One reform that Martin did announce was another
change to the payment of OAS benefits. Commencing in July, 1996 the benefits would
be calculated and paid with the "clawback" amounts included, based upon the person's
previous year's tax return.
22. Budget Implementation Act, 1995, S.C. 1995, c. 17, Part V, sections 48 to'56. Part V of
this Act amends the newly titled Federal-Provincial Fiscal Arrangements Act, R.S.C.
1985, c. F-8, as amended.
23. "Ontario to Review workers' compensation" The Globe and Mail (28 July, 1995) B8.
The review was to be conducted by Cam Jackson, Minister without Portfolio responsi-
ble for WCB.
24. E. Greenspon & R. Mackie, "Premiers divided on federal role", The Globe and Mail
(26 August, 1995) A4.
25. Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Official Reports of Debates (Hansard), (27 September,
1995) at 6.
26. Ontario Regulation 385/95, effective October 1, 1995, implemented the social assis-
tance rate cut. With respect to this new income support program see Ontario, Legisla-
tive Assembly, Official Reports of Debates (Hansard), (10 October, 1995) at 172-174.
27. A residency requirement was prohibited by section 6(2)(d) of CAP. A residency
requirement was also prohibited by the terms of the CHST; see the discussion below
under Fiscal Arrangements.
Squandering Our Inheritance
contained "a statement of principles to guide social policy reform" and "a
framework and agenda for change and renewal". 28 Also in December, the federal
government introduced the new Employment Insurance Act, which was to
replace the Unemployment Insurance Act.
29
January of 1996 saw the release of the Ontario government's discussion paper
on workers' compensation reform, with a concomitant consultation process.
30
In February, the federal, provincial and territorial governments released the
discussion paper on the CPP also complete with consultation process. 3 1 The
federal government finally outlined its proposal for repealing the OAS/GIS
retirement pension scheme and replacing it with the "seniors' benefit" in
March. 32 On April 1, 1996, CAP was effectively repealed and the Canada Health
and Social Transfer became operational.
33
In June of 1996 the Employment Insurance Act came into force. As well, the
report on the consultations on the CPP Paper was released. 34 The federal
government also announced the creation of a task force to examine issues
specifically related to people with disabilities.35 The Ontario government
released its report on the consultations on the workers' compensation discussion
paper.36 Finally, at a federal/provincial first ministers' conference where the
28. Ministerial Council on Social Policy Reform and Renewal - Report to Premiers,
(December, 1995) [hereinafter Ministerial Council Report (1995)].
29. Employment Insurance Act, S.C. 1996, c. 23 [hereinafter the EMA]. The EM was initially
introduced in December 1995. However, Parliament was prorogued and the Bill died.
When Parliament reconvened, the Bill was reintroduced in substantially the same form.
It received Royal Assent in June of 1996.
30. The Honourable Cam Jackson, Minister without Portfolio Responsible for WCB
Reform, New Directions for Workers' Compensation Reform: A Discussion Paper,
(January, 1996).
31. Federal, Provincial and Territorial Governments of Canada, An Information paper for Con-
sultations on the Canada Pension Plan, (February, 1996) [hereinafter the CPP Paper]. For a
discussion of the CPP Paper and the consultation process see R. Elsworth & G. Pearce,
"The Canada Pension Plan: The Year in Review", contained in this volume.
32. Government of Canada, The Seniors Benefit: Securing the Future, (March 6, 1996)
[hereinafter The Seniors Benefit].
33. Supra., note 22.
34. Federal, Provincial and Territorial Governments of Canada, Report on the Canada Pen-
sion Plan Consultations, (June, 1996).
35. E. Greenspon, "Tax deal studied to aid disabled", The Globe and Mail (6 June, 1996)
Al. The task force was to look at the federal role in direct programs for disabled Cana-
dians and financial support for this community. Included in this was an analysis of tax
policy and how it impacts upon the disabled.
36. The Honourable Cam Jackson, Minister without Portfolio Responsible for WCB
(1997) 12 Journal of Law and Social Policy
Ministerial Council Report (1995) was presented, a national child-benefit
scheme was one of the focal points for the discussion of social policy issues.
37
In August of 1996, on the eve of the Premiers' conference in Alberta, the Ontario
government released a "working paper" which posited the complete transfer of
responsibility for the design and delivery of health, welfare and education to the
provinces. 38 While the "working paper" served as a backdrop and a counterpoint
to the Premiers conference, the Premiers released their own "consensus" on
social policy reform, which emphasized the continued leadership of the prov-
inces on social policy, accepted that the integration of income support programs
for children and the disabled were of the highest priority and recommended the
creation of the Federal/ProvincialiTerritorial Council on Social Policy Renewal
(with the initial focus of the provincial/territorial designates to that Council
being the development of "mechanisms and processes to develop and promote
adherence to national principles and standards").
39
In September amendments to the regulations under the GWA allowed for the
institution of workfare in Ontario, and the first workfare placements began.
40
In October, the Ontario government began "consultations" on its new Guaran-
teed Support Plan, which was to cover the disabled and elderly who were then
covered by the social assistance legislation. As well, the federal task force which
was studying disability issues released its report, calling on the federal govern-
ment to institute new programs and tax credits for the disabled, which would
increase the government's expenditures by $100 million annually.41 Finally,
Reform, New Directions for Workers' Compensation Reform: Report of The Honour-
able Cam Jackson, Minister without Portfolio Responsible for Workers' Compensation
Reform, (June 1996).
37. S. Delacourt, R. Seguin and E. Greenspon, "Premiers try to avoid C word", The Globe
and Mail (21 June, 1996) Al.
38. T. Courchene, ACCESS: A Convention on the Canadian Economic and Social Systems,
(August, 1996). The working paper was released by the Ministry of Intergovernmental
Affairs of the Government of Ontario, although the paper states that the views are those
of Professor Courchene. It is, of course, difficult to accept that the Ontario government
would release the paper if it did not accept some of the analysis and solutions set out in
the paper. It is also difficult to believe that the Ontario government would have released
the paper at the time that it did unless it was interested in having the contents of the
paper influence the Premiers' conference.
39. Issues Paper on Social Policy Reform and Renewal: Next Steps, (August, 1996) pre-
pared by the 1996 APC Provincial-Territorial Working Group on Social Policy Reform
and Renewal [hereinafter Premiers' Paper: Next Steps]. Specifically, see recommenda-
tions 1, 2, 3 and 8.
40. 0. Reg. 383/96, effective September 1, 1996.
41. Federal Task Force on Disability Issues, Equal Citizenship for Canadians with Disabil-
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federal and provincial finance ministers met in October to discuss the options
for reforming the CPP, but reached no consensus.
42
After a meeting in November, the Federal/Provincial/Territorial Council on
Social Policy Renewal announced that it had agreed to examine options for the
national child benefit programs (which would involve some combination of the
existing federal child tax benefit and provincial welfare payments for children)
and that it hoped to have a program proposal for approval by January 1997. 4
3
In Ontario, the provincial government introduced entirely new workers' com-
pensation legislation, which was to provide "a balanced approach to reform by
preserving fair and secure benefits for injured workers while at the same time
restoring the financial viability of the Workers' Compensation Board".44
In December, the federal government reached agreements with the provinces of
Alberta and New Brunswick respectively, in which those provinces agreed to
provide job training and other employment services. In exchange for assuming
these responsibilities, the federal government would provide each of the prov-
inces a payment out of the Employment Insurance fund.45 Other provinces were
reported to be close to reaching similar agreements with the federal government.
Ontario, however, did not intend to enter into such an agreement unless the
federal government offered more money.46
In January of 1997 the Ontario government announced a massive restructuring
of the funding arrangements for social services between the provincial govern-
ment and Ontario municipalities. Most significantly, the province and munici-
palities were now to share the cost of funding social assistance on a 50-50 basis,
a change from the previous 80% provincial-20% municipal arrangement. The
ities: The Will to Act, (1996).
42. 'The Canada Pension Plan, The Year in Review", supra, note 31.
43. E. Greenspon, "Fight against child poverty unites Ottawa, provinces", The Globe and
Mail (28 November, 1996) A5.
44. Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Official Reports of Debates (Hansard), (26 November,
1996) at 5338; speech by Elizabeth Witmer, Minister of Labour. The new bill was enti-
fled the Workers' Compensation Reform Act, 1996 (Bill 99) [hereinafter Bill 99].
45. J. Tibbits, "N.B. agrees to shoulder load on services for unemployed", The Globe and
Mail (14 December, 1996) A4 and B. Laghi, "Alberta vows UI savings in job- train-
ing", The Globe and Mail (7 December, 1996) A4. Under the terms of the agreement
with Alberta, the Alberta government agreed that at least 65 per cent of the people
served would be current UI recipients (with the rest presumably being welfare recipi-
ents) and that the government would find jobs for at least 15,000 claimants. The Alberta
government could not impose a residency requirement for using the program.
46. "N.B. agrees to shoulder load on services for unemployed", ibid.
(1997) 12 Journal of Law and Social Policy
province also pledged to create a special reserve fund, which would be available
to municipalities to defray any unexpected increase in social assistance costs.47
Also in January, four federal ministers responded to many of the recommenda-
tions contained in the federal task force report on disability issues, although the
response seemed to be a simple reaffirmation of the status quo.48 Finally, the
Federal/Provincial/Territorial Council on Social Policy Renewal was reported
to have reached an agreement on a national child benefit program which would
consist of an enriched child tax benefit and increased spending by the provinces
on social services directed specifically at children (such as day care, nutrition
programs, school lunches, etc.).
49
In February of 1997, the last month of this chronological outline, the federal,
provincial and territorial finance ministers reached an agreement on reforming
the CPP.5° This agreement appeared to have been made possible because the
Ontario and federal governments reached an understanding, in which the federal
government would cap or reduce EI premiums in exchange for Ontario's support
for the proposed changes to the CPP.51 February of 1997 was also the month in
which the federal government released its budget. That budget contained the
outline of the new National Child Benefit System52 as well as provisions which
responded to some of the concerns raised by the federal task force on disability
issues.53
47. M. Mittelstaedt & J. Rusk, "Municipalities facing major changes to social spending",
The Globe and Mail (14 January, 1997) A3.
48. "Ministers Respond to Disability Task Force", (January 28, 1997) Social Policy
Update, Vol. III, Issue 9 at 2.
49. G. Abbate & C. Mclnnes, "Provinces back B.C. child plan", The Globe and Mail (29
January, 1997) Al. The plan was dependent on a sufficient infusion of cash into the
child tax benefit by the federal government. The amount of money Ottawa was pre-
pared to spend was to be announced in the federal budget in February 1997. The
increased spending by the provinces would actually be a redirection of monies already
spent on children through the social assistance system.
50. Statement by the Honourable Paul Martin, Minister of Finance to the House of Com-
mons (14 February, 1997).
51. E. Greenspon, "Martin strikes CPP deal" The Globe and Mail (14 February, 1997) Al.
52. Department of Finance, Building the Future for Canadians: Budget 1997 - Working
Together Towards a National Child Benefit System, (Her Majesty the Queen in Right of
Canada, 1997) [hereinafter Working Together]. This proposal will be discussed in more
detail below.
53. Department of Finance, Building the Future for Canadians: Budget 1997 - Helping
Canadians with Disabilities, (Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada; February,
1997). These measures included the broadening of the medical expense tax credit, the
creation of a refundable medical expense credit and the creation of an Opportunities
Fund (which was to help develop strategies to reduce barriers to participation and aid
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C. A SNAPSHOT OF SOCIAL PROGRAMS AND FISCAL ARRANGEMENTS
- CIRCA MARCH 1997
At the time of writing, the social policy landscape is in some combination of




Maximum benefits available under the new Employment Insurance Act are
lower and are payable for a shorter period of time.54 Further, benefits received
will be "clawed back" at income tax time if the recipient's annual income (as
defined) exceeds $48,750 a year.55 People who draw on EI repeatedly will see
the level of their benefits reduced even further.56 However, low income families
will receive a higher level of benefits than other claimants, and the level of those
benefits will actually increase over the next couple of years. 57 Finally, "employ-
ment benefits", such as wage subsidies, earnings supplements and assistance for
self-employment, are available under the Employment Insurance Act.58
(b) Canada Pension Plan
Under the terms of the agreement reached by the federal/provincial/territorial
finance ministers retirement, survivor's and disability benefits payable to any
future recipients will be lower.59 Further, CPP disability recipients who have
disabled Canadians to achieve greater financial independence).
54. EA, sections 10(8)(c) and 17. The maximum benefit rate is $413 and will remain at that
level until 2001. The maximum number of weeks for which the benefit is payable is 45.
55. EIA, section 145. This basic ceiling will remain in effect until 2001. However it is low-
ered to $39,000 if the recipient has made multiple EI claims for regular benefits.
56. EA, section 15. Initially a claimants benefit rate is 55% of his or her weekly insurable
earnings. This benefit rate is reduced by 1% for every 20 weeks of EI benefits paid
within the five years preceding the claim.
57. EA, section 16 and Employment Insurance Regulations, SOR/96-332, as amended by
SOR/96-436 and SOR97-31. For 1997 the benefit rate is 65% of the claimant's weekly
insurable earnings, and this rate rises by 5% per year, reaching 80% by the year 2000.
However, the amount of this increased benefit cannot exceed the maximum weekly
benefit payable ($413).
58. Provision for these "employment benefits" is contained in Part II of the EA. Part R also
allows for making agreements with the provinces to administer these benefits.
59. Securing the Canada Pension Plan: Agreement on Proposed Changes to the CPP,
(Human Resources Development Canada, Department of Finance: February, 1997) at
14-16. The earnings-related portion of those benefits will now be based on the average
of the Years' Maximum Pensionable Earnings (YMPE) in the last five years. At present
(1997) 12 Journal of Law and Social Policy
their benefit converted to a retirement pension at age 65, will receive a lower
retirement pension than they would have prior to this agreement.60 Eligibility
requirements for a disability benefit will also be more restrictive, such that an
applicant will now have to have made contributions to the CPP in four of the
last six years (rather than the previous requirement of two out of the last three
years) in order to be eligible. 6 1 Finally, the agreement also provides for a rapid
increase in the contribution rate payable by employers and employees, from
5.85% of contributory salary and wages in 1997 to 9.9% by the year 2003.62
Further, the base upon which this contribution rate is levied will increase,
because the Year's Basic Exemption is to be frozen at $3500.63
(c) Seniors Benefit
The new Seniors Benefit is scheduled to come into effect in the year 2001,
although no legislation has been introduced yet. The maximum benefit payable
to single seniors and to senior couples will be $120 a year more than what would
have been available under the OAS/GIS regime, will be based on the individual's
(or couple's) previous years' tax return and will be fully indexed to inflation. 64
The entire new benefit will be non-taxable and (as with the current GIS
payments) will be subject to reductions for outside income. However, the
deductions for outside income will, in the case of senior couples, be based on
the amount of family income (as is also the case for the GIS payment) and the
it is based on the average of the YMPE in the last three years.
60. Ibid. at 15. At present a disability recipient's retirement pension is based on the YMPE
at the time of retirement. In the future, the retirement pension will be based on the
YMPE at the time of disablement and then indexed to inflation. This in and of itself
will make the pension lower. The impact is also compounded by the fact that the calcu-
lation of the pension will be based in the five year average of the YMPE, as noted
above.
61. Ibid. at 15. The agreement also states that the adminstration of disability benefits has
been tightened to ensure that "only those intended by the legislation receive disability
benefits."
62. Ibid. at 11-12. Under the existing schedule of contributions the contributory rate for the
year 2003 is supposed to be 7.35%. The contribution rate is shared 50-50 by employers
and employees.
63. Ibid. at 12. The Year's Basic Exemption (YBE) is presently set at 10% of the YMPE,
so that when the YMPE increases, so does the YBE. Freezing the YBE will have a dis-
proportionate impact on low income earners, because they will pay an increasingly
larger percentage of their income as CPP contributions. However, a lower YBE will
mean that more low income earners will contribute to the CPP and thus may be eligible
for benefits.
64. Supra, note 32 at 28-29, 32. Single seniors will be entitled to a maximum of $11,420
and senior couples will be entitled to $18,440.
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amount of the monthly payment will be divided equally between the two
individuals. 65 Further, the threshold at which these reductions will take effect
will be much lower than under the OAS/GIS scheme, although the threshold
will be indexed to inflation.66 The Seniors Benefit will not be payable to single
seniors whose outside income exceeds $51,700 or to senior couples whose
family income exceeds $77,500.67 It is estimated that single seniors with outside
income of $35,000 or less and senior couples with outside income between
$30,000 and $35,000 and less will receive the same or higher benefits under the
new Seniors Benefit.68 Further, it is anticipated that by the year 2030 the new
Seniors Benefit will save the federal government more than $8 billion a year.
69
(d) Workers' Compensation
Under the terms of Bill 99 there will be a reduction in the level of benefits
payable for a workplace injury, and the "inflation protection" for those benefits
will be even further reduced. 70 As well, the Workers' Compensation Board will
no longer be providing vocational rehabilitation services to injured workers.
Instead, a worker who is unable to return to employment with the accident
employer will be required to "cooperate" in the development and implementa-
tion of a labour market re-entry plan (LMRP), the goal of this plan being to
65. Supra, note 32 at 27-28.
66. Supra, note 32 at 28-29. For each dollar of outside income the Seniors' Benefit will be
reduced by 50 cents, until it reaches the value of $5160 for a single senior or $10,320
for senior couples (these amounts are equal to the OAS payment that these individuals
would have received under the present scheme). For single seniors, this would occur at
an amount of outside income equal to approximately $14,000 and for senior couples,
this would occur at an amount of outside income equal to approximately $18,000. Once
outside income reached approximately $26,000, the remaining benefit would again be
subject to a deduction of 20 cents for every dollar of outside income; see Table I in The
Seniors Benefit at 66-67. At present, GIS payments are subject to a deduction of 50
cents for every dollar of outside income and are eliminated when outside income is
between $14,000-15,000. However, presently OAS payments are not reduced until an
individual's outside income exceeds $53,215; see National Council of Welfare, A
Guide to the Proposed Seniors Benefit, (Minister of Supply and Services; Summer
1996) at 5, 27.
67. A Guide to the Proposed Seniors Benefit, supra, note 66 at 5.
68. Ibid. at 11-13.
69. Supra, note 32 at 34.
70. At present, an injured worker's benefits are calculated on 90% of his or her pre- acci-
dent net average earnings. This rate is reduced to 85% by Bill 99. Further, at present
most benefits are partially indexed to the rate of inflation. The formula used is (3/4 x
Consumer Price Index) - 1%, although the CPI figure cannot be higher than 4%. Under
Bill 99 this formula is reduced to (1/2 x CPI)-1 % with the same cap on the CPI; see Bill
99, sections 43(2), 49 and 50.
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return the worker to the labour market and to reduce or eliminate the worker's
loss of earnings from the injury.7 1 A worker who fails to cooperate with the
LMRP process could face a reduction or suspension of his or her workers'
compensation benefits.72 Finally, Bill 99 will also severely restrict entitlement
to compensation for certain specific types of disability, most notably chronic
pain and mental stress.
73
(e) Social Assistance
As noted above, social assistance benefits were reduced by 22% in October
1995.74 There is no inflation protection for benefits under either the General
Welfare Assistance Act or the Family Benefits Act and, in the year and a half
since that time, these benefit levels have not been adjusted. However, the major
change in the social assistance program over this time has been the introduction
and implementation of a workfare/welfare-to-work program, known as Ontario
Works. 7 5 The components of Ontario Works as set out in the regulations under
the GWA included: a) employment supports (including assistance with employ-
ment participation expenses such as child care and transportation, assistance
with job searching and basic education or job specific skills training pro-
71. Bill 99, section 42. It would appear that the over-arching principle of the labour market
re-entry plan (LMRP) will be to return the worker to any type of employment as
quickly as possible. A worker will only be entitled to one LMRP which will last for a
fixed time period and will have a fixed cost; see supra, note 36 at 21-22.
72. Bill 99, section 43(5). In the past, workers who failed to cooperate with their vocational
rehabilitation programs would lose their entitlement to the supplement which they were
paid to participate in the VR program. However, in most cases, they would still remain
eligible for the wage loss benefit.
73. Bill 99, section 12(4) and (5) for mental stress and section 13 for chronic pain.
74. Supra, note 26. This reduction applied to all social assistance recipients except for the
aged and disabled recipients under the Family Benefits Act. The maximum benefit rate
for a single employable person was $520 a month. The maximum benefit rate for a
mother with a child under the age of 12 years was $957.
75. It is beyond the scope of this paper and the expertise of the author to provide anything
but a cursory outline and critique of the province's workfare and welfare-to-work pro-
gram. For a good overview and analysis of Ontario Works, workfare and welfare to
work programs please see I. Morrison, "Workfare for Whom? Social Assistance Recipi-
ents and Labour Force Participation" (May, 1996) Social Infopac, Vol. 14 No. 3, Social
Planning Council of Metropolitan Toronto; A. Mitchell, "Workfare: What We Know"
(June, 1996) Social Infopac, Vol. 14 No. 4, Social Planning Council of Metropolitan
Toronto; A. Mitchell, "rhe Political Economy of Workfare" (December, 1996) Social
Infopac, Vol. 14 No. 5, Social Planning Council of Metropolitan Toronto and; I. Morri-
son .' Down by Law': Workplace regulation and workfare", Social Infopac (1997)
forthcoming, and the sources cited therein. For up to the minute information visit the
Workfare Watch World Wide Web Home Page at http://worldchat.com/pub-
lic/tab/wrkfrw/wrkwtch.htm.
Squandering Our Inheritance
grams); 76 b) employment placements (the placement of a job-ready recipient
into a private sector non-subsidized job),77 and; c) community participation
(unpaid community service activities, including community improvement and
community service projects).78 Initially, seniors, the disabled and sole support
parents are exempt from participation in the Ontario Works program. Participa-
tion by all other recipients is mandatory.
79
Ontario Works began in twenty "pilot" municipalities across Ontario in Septem-
ber of 1996 and it was anticipated that the program would apply on a province-
wide basis by the beginning of January 1998.80 Participating municipalities are
required to file a "business plan" for approval, outlining how the municipality
plans to implement the components of Ontario Works. The "business plan" must
include information about: a) the number and type of recipients who will be
referred to each component of Ontario Works; b) how recipients in need of basic
education and training will be identified and referred to existing community
resources and; c) the number of recipients who will access employment and
community support funding. Provincial funding for the delivery of the various
components of Ontario Works will be based upon municipalities meeting these
targets.81
A new definition of "disability" for social assistance purposes is also on the
horizon. 82 Under the Guaranteed Support Program, a proposal discussed at
76. Section 4.3(3)2, Regulation 537, R.R.O. 1990, as amended. See also Ministry of Com-
munity and Social Services, Program Guidelines for Early Implementation of Ontario
Works, (August 1996) at 5, 12.
77. Section 4.3(3)3, Regulation 537, R.R.O. 1990, as amended. See also Program Guide-
lines for Early Implementation of Ontario Works, ibid., at 15-16. It is envisaged that
these "placements" would be arranged by a private sector agency who would be paid
based on a percentage of the social assistance savings associated with the placement of
a recipient.
78. Section 4.3(3)1, Regulation 537, R.R.O. 1990, as amended. See also Program Guide-
lines for Early Implementation of Ontario Works, ibid., at 9-11. These community
placements can be arranged by the municipality or can be initiated by the recipient.
79. Program Guidelines for Early Implementation of Ontario Works, ibid., at S. In the
future, sole support parents with "older" children will be expected to participate as well.
80. Ministry of Community and Social Services News Release, "People will work for their
welfare cheques starting this September" (12 June, 1996) at 2.
81. Ministry of Community and Social Services, Guidelines for the Development of Busi-
ness Plans for the Early Implementation of Ontario Works, (August 1996) at 6-9. How-
ever, the province's announcements with respect to the "downloading" of the cost of
funding of social assistance will obviously have some implications for the province's
funding of Ontario Works. See the discussion below.
82. At present, the definition of disabled person is contained in section 1(5) of Regulation
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public consultations, 83 the definition would only include as "disabled" those
people with physical or mental disabilities which resulted in "severe" restric-
tions on their activities of daily living or their ability to engage in employment.
Further, only disabilities expected to last for longer than two years were to be
covered. Nor did it appear that factors such as the age, education or literacy level
of the disabled person would be taken into account in determining their employ-
ability. Clearly such a definition would result in fewer people qualifying for this
new program. Those who did not qualify would end up on welfare and would
be subject to Ontario Works.
Some proposed improvements in the program included an increased asset limit
for recipients, an increased inheritance trust capital limit and an increased asset
exemption for personal injury awards. 84 However, people with disabilities
would still be required to apply to welfare before being transferred to this new
program, meaning that initially they would be subject to the much more
restrictive asset rules under that program.
85
(f) Canada Child Tax Benefit
Essentially, the Canada Child Tax Benefit (CCTB) is the federal contribution
toward the creation of a National Child Benefit System. The National Child
Benefit System is meant to ensure a more comprehensive and coordinated
approach to child benefits. The objectives of this National Child Benefit System
are to prevent and reduce child poverty, to promote attachment to the labour
336, R.R.O. 1990, as amended. That definition states:
1(5) "disabled person" means a person who has a major physical or mental impairment
that is likely to continue for a prolonged period of time and who, as a result thereof, is
severely limited in activities pertaining to normal living, as verified by objective medi-
cal findings accepted by the medical advisory board.
There is also a definition of "permanently unemployable person" in the regulations,
which states:
1(5) "permanently unemployable person" means a person who is unable to engage in
remunerative employment for a prolonged period of time as verified by objective medi-
cal findings accepted by the medical advisory board.
83. At the time of writing, there had been no definition publicly proposed. The Ministry of
Community and Social Services held public consultations on October 8 and 9, 1996
where the proposals for this new definition were discussed. The author's discussion of
this new definition is based upon the notes of one of the participants and an "Open Let-
ter to the Minister of Community and Social Services from the Income Maintenance
Group" inArchtype, Vol. 14 No. 3/4 (Winter, 1997) at 20-22.
84. Ibid., "Open Letter to the Minister of Community and Social Services" at 21-22.
85. Ibid. at 22.
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force (by ensuring that families are always better off as a result of working) and
to harmonize programs and benefits directed at children. 86
It would appear that the CCTB is simply an enrichment of the existing Child
Tax Benefit/Working Income Supplement. At present the Child Tax Benefit
provides families with a maximum payment of $1020 per child. The amount of
the payment is reduced once family income exceeds $25,921 and disappears
when family income exceeds $66,700.87 The Working Income Supplement now
provides $500 per family (if the family has a minimum of employment income)
to offset the costs of children for low income families. 88 The amount of the
payment is reduced once family income exceeds $20,921 and disappears at
$25,921.89
The new CCTB will be achieved in a two-step process. The first step involves
a restructuring of the Working Income Supplement to provide a benefit for each
child in the family (rather than per family): $605 for the first child, $405 for the
second and $330 for each additional child.90 This change is to take effect as of
July 1997. The second step involves combining the enriched Working Income
Supplement with the existing Child Tax Benefit, which would be payable to the
working and non-working poor alike. Under the CCTB a family would receive
$1625 for the first child and $1425 for each additional child and the value of the
benefit would be reduced according to the same criteria as the present Child Tax
BenefitlWorking Income Supplement.91 There is no indication that either the
benefit levels or the income reduction thresholds would be fully indexed to
inflation. 92 The new CCTB is supposed to be in place by July 1998.
86. Supra, note 52 at 15.
87. Ibid. at 11.
88. Ibid at 12. Families must have a minimum earned income of $3750.
89. Ibid. at 16. The Working Income Supplement disappears at the same time as the Child
Tax Benefit starts to be reduced.
90. Ibid. at 16. The value of the new Working Income Supplement will be payable and be
reduced based upon the same income criteria as the present Working Income Supple-
ment.
91. Ibid. at 18. The CCTB would begin to be reduced once net family income reached
$20,921. When net family income reached $25, 921, the value of the CCTB would be
the same as the current value of the Child Tax Benefit ($1020) and would be reduced in
a like manner.
92. At present the benefit and threshold levels under the Child Tax Benefit are only indexed
to the amount of inflation which exceeds 3 per cent; see Canadian Council on Social
Development, "Backgrounder: Integrating children's benefits: what wil result?", (Janu-
ary, 1997). In its analysis of the National Child Benefit System, the Caledon Institute of
Social Policy noted that "both levels of governments should fully index their child ben-
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Once this new CCTB is in effect, it will reduce the amount of money which the
provinces are required to spend on poor children through their social assistance
systems. The federal, provincial and territorial governments are supposed to
develop a "reinvestment framework" which will govern the reallocation of these
social assistance funds. These reinvestments are to be "targetted at improving
work incentives and supporting children in low-income families" and could
include in-kind benefits, child care services, a child credit, an earned income
credit or some combination of the above.
93
2. Fiscal Arrangements
(a) Canada Health and Social Transfer
Prior to the introduction of the CHST, federal provincial fiscal arrangements
were governed by three different programs. Under Established Programs
Financing (EPF) the federal government provided a "block" transfer to the
provinces (a combination of cash and "tax points" 94) which was initially tied to
funding for post-secondary education and health care.95 Under the Canada
Assistance Plan, the federal government shared the costs of the provision of
social services and social assistance on a 50-50 basis with the provinces.
Essentially, the individual provinces determined how much was spent in these
areas and the federal government was required to pay for half of the cost. 96
Under the Equalization program the federal government made unconditional
transfers to the less well off provinces, to assist them in providing comparable
levels of public services at comparable levels of taxation. 97
In essence, the CHST simply combined the payments for health, post-secondary
education, social assistance and social services under the EPF and CAP into one
payment. Equalization payments were not to be affected. The CHST payment
was to be a combination of cash and tax points. There were few conditions
attached to this federal transfer, save that the provinces were required to ensure
efit programs (both benefits and thresholds)"; see Caledon Institute of Social Policy,
'The Down Payment Budget" (Ottawa, 1997) at 7.
93. Supra, note 52 at 16.
94. A "tax point" is a percentage of the basic federal tax. If a province's income tax is 50
per cent of the basic federal income tax, this would constitute 50 "tax points"; see M.
Mendelson, Looking for Mr. Good-Transfer: A Guide to the CHST Negotiaions
(Ottawa: Caledon Institute of Social Policy) October, 1995 at 3.
95. Budget Plan, Tabled in the House of Commons by the Honourable Paul Martin, Minis-
ter of Finance, (February 27, 1995) at 51 [hereinafter Budget Plan (1995)]. In fact, there
were no requirements attached to the money transfered under the EPF.
96. Ibid. at 52.
97. Ibid.
Squandering Our Inheritance
that the five principles of the Canada Health Act98 were enforced and the
provinces were not allowed to establish a residency requirement for the purposes
of determining entitlement to or on-going eligibility for welfare. 99 There was
however, no obligation that the provinces spend any of this money on health,
post-secondary education, social services or social assistance.
For 1996-1997 the amount of this transfer was to be $26.9 billion, a reduction of
$2.5 billion from what the amount of the transfer would have been under EPF/CAP.
In 1997-1998 the CHST transfer was to be $25.1 billion, a $4.5 billion reduction
from the EPF/CAP amount.t 00 In a five-year funding arrangement negotiated
between the federal government and the provinces, the amount was to remain at
$25.1 billion for fiscal 1998-1999 and 1999-2000 and then to increase by a rate
somewhat lower than the growth rate of the Gross Domestic Product. 10 1 Further,
the federal government has committed to ensuring that the cash portion of the CHST
does not fall below $11 billion for the term of this five-year arrangement. 102
For the 1996-1997 fiscal year the CHST amount was to be allocated in the same
proportion as the EPF/CAP amounts were in 1995-1996.103 From 1997 on, the
98. R.S.C. 1985, c. C-6, as amended.
99. See Federal-Provincial FiscalArrangements Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-8, as amended, sec-
tion 13(1)(b) and (c). Under the Canada Health Act the provinces were required to
maintain a public health insurance scheme which was universal, comprehensive, acces-
sible, portable and publicly administered; see section 7.
100. Section 15(1) of the Federal-Provincial Fiscal Arrangements Act, as amended by S.C.
1996, c.18 s.49.
101. Ibid., section 15(2).The payment is to increase by 2% less than the growth rate of GDP
for 2000-2001, by 1.5% less than the growth rate of GDP for 2001-2002, and by 1%
less than the growth rate of GDP for 2002-2003.
102. Ibid., section 15(3). This is a symbolic, if not important, commitment. One of the gen-
eral criticisms of the CHST as it was initially designed was that, in approximately 10-15
years the cash portion of the transfer could disappear. This would occur if the amount
of the yearly transfer was not indexed (or only partially indexed) and the real monetary
value of the tax points continued to increase; see, for example T. Courchene, Redistrib-
uting Money and Power: A Guide to the Canada Health and Social Transfer, (Toronto:
C.D.Howe Institute, 1995) at 56- 59 and K. Battle, Constitutional Reform by Stealth,
(Ottawa: Caledon Institute of Social Policy, May, 1995) at 3-4. The federal
government's guarantee that the cash portion will not drop below $11 billion was meant
to address this concern, but is subject to two observations. First, the federal government
has stated that based on current projections the cash portion of the CHST would not
drop below $11 billion between 1998 and 2003 anyway. Second, the $11 billion floor
appears only to be guaranteed for the life of the five year funding arrangement; see
Budget Plan, Tabled in the House of Commons by the Honourable Paul Martin, Minis-
ter of Finance, (March 6, 1996) at 57 [hereinafter Budget Plan (1996)].
103. In effect, this extended the effect of the "cap" on CAP payments to Alberta, British
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amount of a province's allocation under the CHST will be adjusted in accordance
with changes in the province's population since 1995. As well, during the life
of the five-year funding arrangement each province's allocation is supposed to
be adjusted to "more closely reflect" its proportion of the total Canadian
population. This "adjustment" was meant to correct for the inequities created
by the "cap" on CAP, which had reduced the CAP allocations for some provinces
during the early 1990s.104
One final aspect of the CHST bears mention. With the demise of the Canada
Assistance Plan, most of the conditions which attached to the transfer were also
removed, the prohibition against a residency requirement for welfare being the
notable exception. Two important conditions of CAP funding which no longer
apply are the requirement to provide assistance to all persons "in need" and the
requirement to have an appeals procedure for welfare decisions. 105 Under the
CHST, the Minister of Human Resources Development and his or her provincial
counterparts are supposed to "work together to develop, through mutual consent,
a set of shared principles and objectives for the other social programs ... that
could underlie the Canada Health and Social Transfer". 106 In part this was the
impetus for the creation of the Ministerial Council on Social Policy Reform and
Renewal. 107 While the Ministerial Council has taken some initiative in devel-
oping national principles and standards, 108 to date there has been no official
federal-provincial recognition of any principles or standards to govern the use
of the CHST monies.
(b) Downloading the cost of social services and welfare to Ontario
municipalities
The restructuring of the funding arrangements for social services in the province
of Ontario was of major proportions. The province had announced that it would
take over full funding of the education system. In exchange, under the changes
proposed, municipalities would face increased cost responsibilities of 150% or
Columbia and Ontario for one more year.
104. Budget Plan (1996) at 58-59. For Ontario, Alberta and British Columbia the allocation
for 1996-1997 would have been based on the reduced amounts they were already
receiving as a result of the "cap"; see Courchene, Redistributing Money and Power,
supra. note 102 at 22-23. If these provinces' allocations were only adjusted for the
change in population since 1995, the effect of the "cap" would have been perpetuated.
105. Supra, note 4, section 6(2).
106. Supra, note 99, section 13(3).
107. Supra, note 24.
108. Supra, note 39 at 12-13.
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more in the following areas: child care, long term care, homes for special care,
emergency hostels, public health and social housing. 109 Most importantly, the
municipalities would be responsible for assuming 50% of the cost of assistance
provided under the General Welfare Assistance Act and 50% of the cost of the
sole support parent case load under the Family Benefits Act. Prior to this
announcement, municipalities had only been responsible for 20% of the cost of
GWA (with the province paying the other 80%) and had not been responsible for
any of the cost of the FBA caseload.1 10 Further, the province announced that
municipalities would be responsible for funding 50% of the cost of the new
income support program for the disabled. 111
This exchange of funding responsibilities between the province and the munic-
ipalities was supposed to be revenue neutral. However, the province also
announced that it would be establishing the Municipal Social Assistance
Reserve Fund "as a prudent safeguard against unforeseen local economic
circumstances", to be used to defray unexpectedly high social assistance costs
in a municipality. 112 In fact, the proposal to "download" the cost of these
programs to the municipal level met with widespread opposition. There had been
no previous consultation with municipalities about such a proposal and it was
contrary to the conclusions and recommendation of all major studies on the
restructuring of municipal/provincial fiscal arrangements. 113 There were clear
inequities which would result from funding an income redistribution scheme,
"which would be driven by economic conditions which are completely outside
the control of municipal governments," out of property taxes, which bear no
correlation to an individual's ability to pay the tax. 114 Further, the claim that the
109. A. Golden, "Tory downloading will hurt Metro the most", The Toronto Star (22 Janu-
ary, 1997) (page unknown). In some areas like long term care, homes for special care
and social housing the municipalities did not have any previous funding responsibili-
ties.
110. Ministry of Community and Social Services News Release (14 January, 1997), "Ecker
Announces New Plan for Social And Community Health Services" at 1, 4.
111. Ibid. at 6. See the discussion of the Guaranteed Support Program above. The municipal-
ities were not expected to share in the design of this program.
112. Ibid. at 1. See also, supra note 47. Initially the fund was supposed to contain $700 mil-
lion, but it was anticipated that this amount would be increased. However, there was no
indication as to how the monies in the fund would be allocated or what the eligibility
criteria would be for accessing the fund.
113. For example see Report of the Ontario Fair Tax Commission, Fair Taxation in a
Changing World, (Toronto: Queen's Printer for Ontario, 1993) at 666-667; Report of
the GTA Task Force, Greater Toronto, (Toronto: Queen's Printer of Ontario, 1996) at
142; Final Letter from David Crombie, Chair, Who Does What Advisory Panel to Al
Leach, Minister of Municipal Affairs and Housing (Ontario)(December 23, 1996) at 1.
114. See Report of the Commissioner of Community Services to the Human Services Coin-
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restructuring would be revenue neutral for the municipalities was also chal-
lenged.11 5 Finally, it was noted that, while municipalities would have this added
financial responsibility, they would not have any input into the design and
implementation of the programs they were funding. 116
Perhaps in recognition of these (and other) criticisms the provincial government
seemed to backtrack from its initial proposals. Two joint provincial/municipal
teams were established, which were to "advise the government on a wide range
of design, transition and management issues relating to a new alignment of
responsibilities." The first issues to be discussed by the team created to deal
with social and community health services were the design of the Municipal
Social Assistance Reserve Fund and "the potential for 'alternative' cost-sharing
methods for social programs.
' 117
Further, the urgency of the restructuring seemed to have abated, with legislation
on the cost-sharing and on the reserve fund not expected until the end of 1997
and with full implementation possibly delayed until the year 2000.118
D. THEMES FROM THE RE-FORMATION
1. "Trickle Down" Social Policy
What is apparent from the chronological outline of events and the overview of
social programs and fiscal arrangements is that while the Canadian welfare state
mittee of the Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto, "Implications of the Provincial
Announcements on the Community Services Department" (29 January, 1997) at 6.
115. Ibid. at 4-5, 7. The Commissioner of Community Services for Metropolitan Toronto
noted that the Community Services Department's budget would need to increase by
almost $1.4 billion to cover the added financial responsibilities while the municipality's
required expenditures on education would only be reduced by $1.25 billion. In fact, it
was estimated that under the new financial arrangements, Metropolitan Toronto would
have almost $380 million added to its financial responsibilities; see "The ugly face of
the Tory tax cut", The Toronto Star (18 January, 1997) at B2.
116. Supra, note 114 at 8-9.
117. Ministry of Community and Social Service News Release, "Municipalities to have a
say as partners on Who Does What Reforms" (21 January, 1997) at 1.In fact, by March
of 1997, it was reported that such an "alternative cost-sharing method" was being dis-
cussed. In exchange for municipalities assuming the costs of construction and mainte-
nance of school buildings, school busing and the business administration costs of local
education the province would assume the full cost of welfare and long term health-care
costs; see J. Rusk, "Ontario to scrap offloading proposal", The Globe and Mail (14
March, 1997) Al.
118. J. Rusk, 'Teams set up to discuss Ontario fiscal reforms", The Globe and Mail (22
February, 1997) A12.
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has undergone substantial change in the 1990s, the re-formation has been
achieved on a program by program basis. There has not been a comprehensive
review and reform of Canadian "social policy". Perhaps the clearest example of
the absence of any comprehensive approach can be seen in proposals contained
in the CPP Paper and in the province's discussion paper on workers' compen-
sation reform. The discussion paper proposed reducing a worker's compensation
benefits by the amount of CPP payments received, rather than allowing the
"stacking" of CPP and workers' compensation benefits. It was argued that this
"overcompensation" of the injured worker was a disincentive to his or her return
to employment.119 The CPP Paper, on the other hand, proposed reducing the
CPP disability pension payable by the amount of workers' compensation ben-
efits received, to ensure that the accident employer would bear the cost of a
workplace injury, and to reduce the disincentives to return to work that resulted
from the "stacking" of these benefits. 12
0
Further, the reform of the individual programs has occurred with little consid-
eration for the impact that they will have on other programs and policies. These
impacts simply "trickle down" through the system. For example, throughout the
1990's the tightening of the eligibility criteria for unemployment/employment
insurance has resulted in fewer people qualifying for UI/EI benefits and those
who do qualify are receiving lower benefits and are exhausting their benefits
more quickly. This has in turn led to an increase in the number of people applying
for and receiving social assistance in Ontario. The financial burden of this
increasing social assistance caseload was compounded by the reduction in the
federal government's contribution to the cost of social assistance, first through
the "cap" on CAP and subsequently through the reduced CHST monies. The
province responded to these circumstances in several ways. First, there was a
concerted effort made to ensure that disabled social assistance recipients who
might also be eligible for CPP applied for the CPP disability benefit. This in
turn led to a noticeable increase in the number of CPP disability recipients 121
which lead to a tightening of the disability eligibility criteria under that program
and was one of the major reasons behind the impetus to reform the CPP.122
119. Supra, note 30 at 38-39.
120. Supra, note 31 at 38. In fact, at the public consultations on the CPP Paper in Toronto
on April 15, 1996, which the author attended, one of the Ontario representatives on the
consultation panel was not even aware of the conflict between the proposals in the CPP
Paper and those in the discussion paper on workers' compensation produced by his
own government.
121. Income Security Programs Branch, Human Resources Development Canada, CPP Dis-
ability Incidence Study: Main Report ("First Smooth Draft") (June 1995) at 65.
122. Supra, note 31 at 24.
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Second, and perhaps more significantly, the province reduced the level of social
assistance benefits for all employable persons and made the eligibility criteria
much more stringent (such as the requirement to participate in Ontario Works).
Finally, the province proposed to download the cost of funding social assistance
to the municipalities.
It is this last response which could have the most far-reaching impact, if it is not
amended. For example, while there are no conditions attached to how the
province spends the money it receives from the federal government under the
CHST, municipalities are statutorily obligated to provide social assistance. 123
Given their limited powers for raising revenue, municipalities are likely to
demand that benefit levels be even further reduced and eligibility criteria be
even further restricted, so as to limit the cost of providing social assistance.
Further, municipalities are likely to use the Ontario Works program as a method
of cost control, by forcing recipients to participate who are not really employable
(i.e., sole support parents with very young children, the disabled who should
eventually be transferred to the Guaranteed Support Program) and terminating
those who refuse to participate. 124 Finally, given the nature of the other respon-
sibilities which could be downloaded to the municipalities, the funding of social
assistance will be in direct competition with services which have a great deal
more public support, such as nursing homes and homes for the aged, and whose
cost is expected to increase rapidly over the coming years.125 It is unlikely that
there will be any support for the provision of social assistance beyond the
minimum required by law.
In the end, it is the most disadvantaged individuals who will suffer the greatest
degree of hardship as a result of the lack of comprehensive social policy reform.
This may not have been the intent, but it is certainly the result of the practice of
"trickle down" social policy.
2. Devolution of the responsibility for social policy to the provinces
Without a doubt, it is the provinces who are the lead players in the social policy
field. They have sole responsiblity for the design and delivery of workers'
compensation. For all practical purposes, given the lack of conditions attached
to the CHST monies, they have sole responsiblity for social assistance. They
123. General Welfare Assistance Act, section 7(1), supra, note 14.
124. This of course leads to a question of whether there will be a meaningful appeals process
for decisions under Ontario Works. With the repeal of CAP the province is no longer
obliged to even have an appeals system for social assistance decisions.
125. See, for example, note 114 at 18 for a discussion of this issue in the context of Metro-
politan Toronto.
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have joint stewardship with the federal government over changes to the CPP,
and through this joint stewardship they have managed to influence the Employ-
ment Insurance program to some extent, by linking increases in CPP contributions
to reductions in EI premiums. Further, the provinces are becoming the sole provider
of job training and other employment services, both under the EIA and through their
welfare programs. Finally, the Ministerial Council on Social Policy Reform and
Renewal was instrumental in the evolution of the National Child Benefit System.
Provision of income support to the elderly under the Senior's Benefit is the sole
area of social policy where the federal government has acted alone.
As noted above, the CHST recommendation that the federal government and the
provinces develop "a set of shared principles and objectives for the other social
programs" was part of the motive for creating the Ministerial Council. Of course,
the unilateral alteration of federal-provincial transfer payments (which the
CHST represented) would have been motive enough. In the Ministerial Council
Report (1995) the Ministerial Council set out its recommendations for "new
directions" in the field of social policy including a national income support
program for children, consolidation of income support for people with long term
and significant disabilities, harmonization or integration of income support for
working age adults and the continuation of the federal delivery of income
support for the elderly.126 The Ministerial Council Report (1995) also outlined
the principles which the provinces determined should govern social policy
reform as follows:
" social programs must be accessible and serve the basic needs of all
Canadians;
" social programs must reflect our individual and collective responsibility;
° social programs must be affordable, effective and accountable; and
" social programs must be flexible, responsive and reasonably compara-
ble across Canada.
127
Further, it was the Premiers' Paper - Next Steps, released at the annual Premiers'
conference in August 1996, which recommended the creation of the Federal/Provin-
cialTerritorial Council on Social Policy Renewal and posited an integrated child
benefit as the highest priority.
In one sense, the role of the Ministerial Council is welcome as it appears to
signal a more systemic and comprehensive approach to social policy. The fact
that a consensus was reached on such complex issues was remarkable. However,
126. Supra, note 28 at 14.
127. Ibid. at 5-7.
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this consensus, which was reached in private and without any input from
Canadians concerned about social policy issues, has now become the framework
for the provinces "negotiations" with the federal government with respect to
future social policy issues in Canada. There is concern that the consensus which
the provinces have achieved does not envision a strong national presence in the
development and enforcement of "national standards" 128 and is designed only
to enhance provincial powers and/or relieve provincial fiscal responsibilities. It
is arguable that some provincial governments might be happy with no role for
the federal government in this area, as was proposed in the Ontario government's
"working paper" released prior to the 1996 Premiers' conference. 129 Finally,
there should be concern over how committed the provinces might be to even the
principles adopted by the Ministerial Council, where it does not suit their
political agenda. In the Ministerial Council Report (1995) it is stated:
Initiatives to eliminate government deficits and manage debt should not
result in a unilateral shift of costs from one government to another. This
will require ongoing and frank consultation on the impacts of the proposed
strategies and the possible development of alternatives to meet fiscal
requirements. 130
Clearly, the province of Ontario had forgotten this principle when it developed
its proposals for downloading the costs of social services and social assistance
to the municipalities.
3. The Rhetoric of Social Policy Reform
The change in the language in which social programs and social policy was being
discussed was pervasive and persuasive. At times it bordered on mean-spirited
and it always seemed directed at justifying and rationalizing the reductions and
limitations in the various programs.
In the build up to the release of the Green Paper the federal government seemed
to consciously emphasize the worst stereotypes about social program recipients.
Lloyd Axworthy, Minister of Human Resources Development, warned high
school students that they could no longer expect to "bum around for a while"
on welfare after they leave school. 131 Noting that the country was $500 billion
128. Actually, the Premiers' Paper - Next Steps does not even contemplate enforcement of
national standards. Rather, it refers to developing mechanisms and processes for "pro-
moting adherence" to national principles and standards (at 13).
129. Supra, note 38.
130. Supra, note 28 at 17.
131. G. York, "'The clock is ticking' on social reform plans", The Globe and Mail (21 Feb-
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in debt, Prime Minister Jean Chretien warned that it was no longer acceptable
to work for a few months and then spend the rest of the year on social assistance
"sitting at home and drinking beer". 132
More often the language was much subtler. It was argued that social programs
were too "passive" (i.e., simply providing people with income), that they
fostered "dependency" and that they needed to be more "active" (i.e., focusing
on getting people back to work). "Generous" social programs were said to cause
"disincentives" to work. Programs needed to be reformed to eliminate "waste
and duplication", to reduce "fraud and abuse", to ensure that benefits were only
paid to the "truly needy" or the "truly disabled".
This change in rhetoric was indicative of a growing disdain for those in need of
income support. This disdain was not limited to the affluent or those who had
never had to rely on an income maintenance program. Recipients of various
programs often had little regard for other recipients, whether they were recipi-
ents under the same or a different program. Further, it did not seem to matter
whether there was any truth in the language. Governments either knew or were
told that these assumptions and beliefs were often incorrect or inaccurate. 133
However, as the language served to make their actions more palatable to the
Canadian public, they did little to correct these mistaken opinions.
4. Social Programs Must Be "Sustainable"
A common reason for pursuing reform was to ensure that social programs would
be "sustainable" and would be there for those who will need them. In announcing
the pending reforms of both the OAS/GIS system and the CPP, Finance Minister
Paul Martin stated:
Canadian seniors deserve to know that those public pensions will be there
for them. That in turn requires reform to ensure that the pension system is
sustainable in the long term. 134
mary, 1994) Al.
132. "'Break that mentality' PM says", The Globe and Mail (21 April, 1994) A4.
133. See for example; the communications strategy attached to a leaked draft document from
the federal government entitled "Social Security Reform - Draft for discussion" (May,
1994) where it was stated "The public's definition of abuse includes legitimate and
recognised use of programs which the public sees as too lenient". For a discussion of
the chasm between rhetoric and reality with respect to welfare fraud and abuse see I.
Morrison & G. Pearce, "Under the Axe: Social Assistance in Ontario in 1995", 11 J.L.
& Social Pol'y 1 at 4-5.
134. Supra, note 21 at 20.
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Ontario's Labour Minister Elizabeth Witmer stated that the reforms to the
province's workers' compensation system contained in Bill 99 would be "sen-
sitive to the needs of injured workers and sustainable by the employers who fund
the system". 13
5
The quest for "sustainability" is often tied to a funding crisis for the social
program in question. 136 Of course, achieving "sustainability" can be done in
two ways. Either revenue collection could be increased (by raising taxes or
increasing the amount of a statutory payroll deduction) or benefit payments
could be lowered (either by reducing or freezing the benefit amount or by only
partially indexing the benefit). In almost all cases, "sustainability" is achieved
through lowering benefit payments. 137 The standard reasons given for refusing
to rely on increased revenue collection are that Canadians are "tax weary" and
will not accept tax increases or that increasing payroll taxes hinders job cre-
ation. 138 This approach ignores the fact that every year Canadians are faced with
implicit tax increases because income tax brackets are not fully indexed to
inflation and it also ignores much evidence which indicates that payroll taxes
do not have this impact on the creation of jobs. 139 It also would appear to ignore
the fact that people who receive income support payments spend a greater
proportion of that income in the domestic economy than would people who
receive an income tax or payroll tax reduction.
5. Reducing, Freezing or De-indexing Benefits
The benefits available under social assistance, EI, workers' compensation, CPP
and the CCTB140 have been reduced. The only payments which are scheduled
135. Supra., note 44.
136. See for example, A. Freeman, "Canada Pension going broke", The Globe and Mail (25
February, 1995) BI and M. Mittelstaedt, "WCB shortfall grows at $1 million a day",
The Globe and Mail (24 August, 1994) B2. Provincial and federal deficits have also
proved useful in this regard.
137. This issue will be explored in the next section.
138. The one notable exception to this approach is the increase in the contribution rate under
the CPP. However, it should be noted that this increase was directly related to a
decrease in the employment insurance premium, and actually resulted in a windfall for
employers. This is because employers make a greater percentage contribution to every
dollar of revenue raised under EI than they do under the CPP.
139. R. Shillington, 'The Tax System and Social Policy Reform" in J. Pulkingharn & G.
Ternowetsky, eds., Remaking Canadian Social Policy: Social Security in the Late
1990s (Halifax: Femwood Publishing, 1996) at 102.
140. The Canada Child Tax Benefit is included in this grouping because the value of that
benefit will also be reduced for low income families with only one child. Prior to the
changes announced for the Child Tax Benefit, the Working Income Supplement was
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to increase are the Senior's Benefit (by $120), the benefits payable to low
income families under EI and benefits payable to low income families with more
than one child under the CCTB. Further, only benefits payable under the CPP
and the Senior's Benefit are fully indexed to inflation. Benefits payable under
social assistance and EI can only be increased by direct government action, and
the benefits available under workers' compensation and the present Child Tax
Benefit are only partially indexed to inflation.
141
As noted above, the most common justification for the reduction, freezing or
de-indexation of benefits is that the costs of such programs are no longer
"sustainable". However, other rhetorical tools have also been used to rationalize
these actions. For example, it is argued that social programs are a "disincentive"
to employment; because people can satisfy their needs with money from the
program they are not inclined to work. Therefore, if the benefit levels are
reduced, then people will have an economic imperative to seek work. It was also
argued that reform was necessary to ensure that only the "truly" needy or the
"truly" disabled were receiving assistance. Implicit in these messages was the
fact that there were people receiving assistance who did not need it or were not
entitled to it. However, there has never been any serious discussion as to what
makes someone "truly" needy or what minimum level of income replacement
would be considered adequate and socially acceptable. The rhetoric about
"disincentives" to work and the targetting of benefits to the "truly" needy sounds
disingenuous with respect to social programs which are both under-inclusive
and provide less than subsistence levels of benefits.
Further, even accepting that social programs are sufficiently inclusive and
provide adequate benefits, the absence of full inflation protection cannot be
justified. For example, in the area of social assistance, much effort is devoted
to determining an applicant's or recipient's level of assets and level of income
from outside sources. Once determined, the level of assets and income is
constantly reviewed. The rationale for this investigation is that social assistance
is supposed to be the income maintenance program of last resort and individuals
are expected to exhaust other financial resources before a benefit is payable.
scheduled to increase to $750 for 1997 and to $1000 for 1998. In 1997, a low income
family with one child would have received $1770 under the former Child Tax Bene-
fit/Working Income Supplement scheme as opposed to $1625 under the new CCTB. In
1998, the same family would have received $2020; see National Anti-Poverty Organi-
zation, "The 1997 Budget and the Child Tax Benefit" (21 February, 1997) at 2 and 1.
Morrison*& A. Mitchell, "The National Child Benefit: Making a Down Payment by
Skipping out on the Rent?", Vol. 16 Social Safety News (March 1997) at 4.
141. There is also only partial indexation for the amounts which are transferred to the prov-
inces under the CHST.
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However, having determined that an individual is "truly" needy because he or
she has no other sources of income, what possible justification can there be for
allowing this minimal level of income to erode through the workings of infla-
tion? The absence of full inflation protection for benefits payable under any
program is, in effect, a benefit reduction for which the government responsible
for the program never has to answer.
6. "Encouraging" Attachment to the Labour Force
As noted above, one of the critiques of most social programs is that they are not
sufficiently "active" in terms of getting people back to work. In fact, attachment
to the labour force is an increasingly important aspect of the design, funding
and eligibility criteria of most programs. Contributions based on covered
employment are the means of funding social insurance programs like EI, CPP
and workers' compensation. As well, in some cases a minimum attachment to
the labour force is also required before being eligible for benefits.142 Finally,
the benefit levels under the social insurance schemes are higher than those
schemes, like social assistance, which are funded out of general revenues. While
this would appear to be an explicit reward for labour force attachment, it is also
a further disadvantage to those, like women and the disabled, who face acknowl-
edged barriers to employment and thus, if they are entitled at all, would more
likely receive lower benefits. The most recent example of a benefit being
provided as a "reward" for attachment to the labour force can be seen in the
Canada Child Tax Benefit. The benefit will be paid to all low income families
with children. However, while it will represent an increase for some low income
families who have income from employment, it will provide no benefit to low
income families who rely on social assistance, as it will be deducted dollar for
dollar from their social assistance entitlement. Instead, it will serve as an
"incentive" to find employment.
In some circumstances, the reason for the break in the attachment to the labour
force can be cause for refusing or disentitling a person to benefits. The most
common examples of this occur under the Employment Insurance Act and the
General Welfare Assistance Act. A person who voluntarily leaves their employ-
ment without just cause or who loses theirjob by reason of their own misconduct
is disentitled from receiving EI benefits, regardless of how long or how much
they might have contributed in El premiums. 143 Under the GWA loss of employ-
142. See for example the Years' Basic Exemption under CPP and the requirement under
section 7 of the EA to have worked for a minimum number of hours before being eligi-
ble for benefits.
143. Section 30 of EX. Prior to the amendments made to the Unemployment Insurance Act
in 1993, loss of employment under these circumstances would result in a disqualifica-
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ment under these circumstances will result in a person being ineligible for
benefits for three months.144
If a person does have a break in their attachment to the labour force and does
qualify for assistance under any given program, an almost immediate and
on-going requirement for that recipient is to "re-attach" to the labour force. The
emphasis of this requirement is not on how best to "re-attach" the individual to
the labour force so as to preclude a future reliance on an income maintenance
program. Rather, the emphasis is on how quickly the individual can be "re-
attached" to the labour force. 145 Further, the failure to "re-attach" can result in
a suspension or reduction of benefits.
Most often this effort at "re-attachment" is manifested by a job search require-
ment. Sometimes minimal skills and education upgrading is available. Only in
the rarest of cases is comprehensive retraining or occupational rehabilitation
offered. That this is the case is of course not surprising. Retraining and rehabil-
itation programs are very expensive to provide and can threaten the "sustainabil-
ity" of the program in question. However, this approach is not in keeping with
the rhetoric about retraining. The Green Paper discussed the importance of
"employment development services" at length, recognizing that while they were
more expensive than simple income support, they were an important investment
in helping people get off social programs and back into the paid labour force.
The objective of these services should be "helping people find good jobs". 146
Finally, the reform of social programs took little account of the changing nature
of the workplace or the labour market. The increase in non-standard employ-
ment, including part time work, self-employment and temporary and contract
work, is well known. 147 Most of those engaged in non- standard employment
do not have access to traditional employment benefits such as sickness, disabil-
ity and retirement plans. As such, access to the protections provided by the social
tion for between 7 and 12 weeks.
144. Section 4.2 of Regulation 537, supra, note 14. Prior to this Ocotber 1995 change in the
regulation, a person who lost their employment under these circumstances would have
been ineligible for benefits for one month. If that penalty was "unreasonably harsh",
then assistance could simply be reduced for that period of one month.
145. See for example, supra, note 71 with respect to the Labour Market Re-entry Plan under
workers' compensation and Program Guidelines for Early Implementation of Ontario
Works, supra note 76 at 11 with respect to the goals of workfare.
146. Supra, note 3 at 30.
147. For a good discussion of this issue see Human Resources Development Canada, Report
of the Advisory Group on Working Time and the Distribution of Work (Minister of Sup-
ply and Services Canada; 1994) at 27-35.
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insurance programs discussed could be of great importance. However, the
self-employed are not entitled to EI coverage and are not generally covered by
workers' compensation. Further, depending on the nature of the part time or
contract work, coverage for the benefits available under CPP could be limited.
Not one of the reform processes discussed gave any serious consideration to
expanding coverage to address these issues.
E. CONCLUSION
There are costs that arise when a person cannot obtain income from employment,
or cannot obtain sufficient income from employment, due to the loss of a job,
insufficient skills, injury, disability or family responsibilities. Those costs are
both social and economic and they do not disappear when we as a society decide
that we can no longer "afford" certain types of social programs. When we
discuss the costs of social programs, what we are really discussing is who should
bear the costs and not whether they should be borne at all.
The response to these social and economic circumstances must be more coor-
dinated. The myriad of income security programs in Canada no longer indepen-
dently fulfill the important purposes for which they were designed. A new
system, one which recognizes the strengths and weaknesses of the present
system must be devised. With the gradual decline of government deficits as the
primary focus of political discourse, and with growing recognition that social
programs have borne an inordinate share of the burden of deficit reduction, it is
possible that the time is ripe for a comprehensive anti-poverty strategy. The
re-forming of these programs which has occurred during the 1990s has provided
an important context for a more comprehensive approach to reform. To continue
to proceed on divergent and independent paths will only lead to a repetition of
the mistakes which have brought us to this point in the first place.
